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This paper performs market and funding liquidity stress testing of the Luxembourg banking sector using 
stochastic haircuts and run-off rates. It takes into account not only the shocks to the banking sector and banks’ 
responses to them, but second-round effects due to the effects of banks’ reactions on asset prices and reputation. 
In general, banks’ business lines and, therefore their buffers’ composition, determine the net effect of the shocks 
on banks’ stochastic liquidity buffers. So, results differ across banks. Second-round effects exemplify the 
relevance of contagion effects that reduce the systemic benefits of diversification. While systemic liquidity risk 
is low following a shock to the interbank market, for Luxembourg, with its high number of subsidiaries of large 
foreign financial institutions, the results indicate the importance of monitoring the liquidity of parent groups to 
which Luxembourg institutions belong. In particular, shocks to related-party deposits are important. Finally, the 
results, including those of a run-on-deposits shock, show the relevance of system-wide measures to minimize 
the systemic effects of liquidity crises. 
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Résumé non-technique 
 
Cette étude a pour objectif de quantifier l’endurance du secteur bancaire luxembourgeois face à 
l’émergence de chocs de liquidité. La méthodologie adoptée est similaire à celle décrite dans l’étude 
de J.W. van den End (2008). De multiples chocs ont été adoptés. Ils consistent en un choc sur le 
marché interbancaire, un choc sur les dépôts intra-groupe et un choc que simule une panique bancaire. 
Les chocs sur la liquidité sont approchés par des simulations stochastiques relatives à la fois  aux taux 
de décotes sur les  coussins («buffers ») de liquidités, mais aussi aux paramètres représentatifs de la 
diminution des dépôts bancaires. Les effets de premier tour consistent en l’analyse de l’impact de ces 
chocs, et des réactions endogènes des banques. On modélise ensuite les effets du second tour, induits 
par  la réponse endogène des banques, et de leur impact sur les prix de marché des actifs et sur la 
réputation des établissements bancaires. Une telle approche permet d’appréhender l’interaction entre 
les liquidités de marché et l’accès aux refinancements pendant les périodes de crises. Nos résultats 
révèlent que l’effet net d’un choc sur le marché interbancaire et d’un choc sur les dépôts intra-groupe 
des banques luxembourgeoises est conditionné par le degré de spécialisation des banques. Les dépôts 
intra-groupes jouent un rôle fondamental dans la réaction des banques aux chocs. Néanmoins, il y a 
lieu de noter que les effets du second tour sur les données agrégées du secteur bancaire demeurent 
qualitativement équivalents à ceux affectant le buffer de liquidité au premier tour. L’analyse de 
l’impact sur les banques de manière individuelle fait ressortir  des différences importantes, qui 
s’expliquent par leur spécialisation et par la composition de leurs buffers. Quantitativement, les effets 
de deuxième tour illustrent l’importance des effets de contagion, de la progression du risque 
systémique et de la réduction des avantages de la diversification qu’ils entraînent. Même si le risque 
de liquidité systémique est assez réduit, les résultats plaident en faveur de l’amélioration de la 
surveillance de la liquidité des groupes bancaires auxquels les établissements de crédit 
luxembourgeois appartiennent. Ceci est d’autant plus vrai que la gestion de la liquidité est demeure 
centralisée, tandis que le financement est décentralisé. Ceci est cohérent avec une leçon majeure de la 
Crise, à savoir, que la compréhension des processus de contagion  est impossible sans une très bonne 
connaissance des activités bancaires transfrontières. Par ailleurs, les résultats montrent la pertinence 
des mesures prises ex-ante comme ex-post au niveau du système bancaire pour minimiser les effets 
des crises de liquidité, telles que l’adoption d’un cadre robuste pour la gestion de la liquidité et des 
plans de gestion des risques, l’imposition de buffers de liquidité et le renforcement de l’assurance des 
dépôts bancaires. Enfin, le cadre méthodologique des tests d’endurance sur la liquidité décrit dans 
cette étude est un outil macro-prudentiel susceptible d’améliorer notre compréhension de l’interaction 
entre la liquidité et la stabilité financière.   3
I.  Motivation 
 
The severity and peculiarities of the current crisis have motivated a wide spread rethinking of 
financial, monetary and supervisory frameworks. From accounting rules to the operation of rating 
agencies, from the role of central banks and their objectives to the basic paradigm of prudential 
supervision, academic research, high level meetings, working groups and task forces have started to 
set the pillars of new institutions and market practices aiming at minimizing the risk of a similar crisis 
repeating itself in the future. 
 
One major policy message from the crisis is the need to develop the macro-prudential element of 
financial stability policy. It is now generally accepted that micro-prudential regulation and supervision 
of individual institutions and markets, while necessary, is not sufficient, because it does not consider 
the interactions among financial institutions and between the financial system and the real sector. For 
macro-prudential policy to minimize the risk that financial instability would result in broader costs to 
the economy, it needs to develop quantitative macro-prudential operating targets to measure and 
monitor the main determinants of systemic risk, both in its time series dimension (e.g., countercyclical 
capital charges) and in its cross-section dimension (e.g., interbank lending concentration limits) 
(Borio and Drehmann, 2009). As a result, a number of macro-prudential instruments are already in 
use or under consideration, admittedly in a context in which much remains to be done to properly 
understand the macro-prudential transmission mechanism in general, and specifically, its interaction 
with monetary policy. 
 
Macro stress tests belong to the set of operating instruments that have been used to trace the response 
of the financial system to large, but plausible exogenous shocks. While forward-looking in their 
nature, they have suffered from the failure to capture in a robust way the feedback effects between the 
financial system and the macroeconomy, and to portray a key aspect of financial distress, namely, that 
small shocks can have large systemic effects (Drehmann, 2009). In a cross-section dimension, stress 
tests have incorporated the interactions between institutions, markets and infrastructure to study how 
these contribute to the vulnerabilities of the financial system. Stress tests have proven to be useful 
operating instruments for central banks, supervisors and banks. However, it was not until well into 
2007 that it became clear that a top priority for financial stability is to strengthen the understanding of 
the role of interconnectedness among financial institutions, of common exposures to risks, of the 
endogeneity of agents’ responses, of  the conditionality of parameters on stress events, and other 
significant systemic features. 
 
One peculiarity of the current financial crisis has been the seizing up of the interbank market. This 
dramatically revealed the endogeneity of liquidity in a fiat-currency economy, and the ensuing need to 
take into account liquidity risk in stress testing exercises of the banking system. Rapid changes to 
endogenous liquidity can quickly reverberate through the financial system and exhaust banks’ 
liquidity buffers via asset price changes, drying up of liquidity lines, and outright paralysis of the   4
interbank market as a result of large increases in counterparty risk and uncertainty. However, market 
liquidity and funding liquidity
1 have not often been taken into account by banks, monetary authorities 
and supervisors in their stress-testing models in ways that make clear the systemic implications of 
liquidity shocks (IMF, 2008). Liquidity stress testing has become an essential part of IMF Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs since 2001, which have assumed shocks to deposits, to wholesale 
funding and used cross-border scenarios in which foreign parent banks stop funding the domestic 
subsidiaries (Moretti et al, 2008). Clearly, enhanced frameworks for systemic liquidity stress testing 
will become a crucial instrument for international bodies called to perform macro-prudential tasks, 
such as the European Systemic Risk Board. 
 
Most banks’ stress-testing exercises have not included the intrinsic relation between counterparty 
credit risk, funding and market liquidity. In part, this was the result of a widely held view in the 
literature that competitive interbank markets foster resilience and are robust. Yet, the crisis has made 
obvious that more thought needs to be given to the design of interbank market infrastructure, 
including collateral frameworks. 
 
In addition, even in most available stress testing exercises and contingency funding plans, banks do 
not consider the feedback effect of their actions on the price of assets or on their reputation as they 
react to recover their desirable liquidity buffers—during the crisis, some banks did experience 
difficulties in selling assets or pledging assets in secured lending (ECB, 2008). 
 
Given the existence of (non-risk related) deposit insurance and the history of central bank intervention 
to provide sufficient liquidity during crises, moral hazard considerations suggest that banks hold 
suboptimal levels of liquidity. Overall, liquidity risk is underpriced and the crisis has made clear that 
it was excessive. 
 
Finally, more is still needed for robust liquidity stress testing, such as incorporating off-balance sheet 
risks, covering cross-border transmission channels, modelling the behavioural responses of agents, 
and including non-bank financial institutions.  
 
In Luxembourg, the Law of 24 October, 2008, made the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BCL) 
responsible for the surveillance of the general liquidity situation on the markets as well as financial 
market operators. As a result, the BCL has been developing tools to this end. Rychtarik (2009) 
develops an approach to measure the liquidity risk sensitivity of banks in Luxembourg from the 
viewpoint of the impact of shocks on banks’ liquidity ratios. The test, applied to a sample of 32 banks, 
                                                 
1 According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2008, market liquidity risk is “the risk 
that a firm cannot easily offset or eliminate a position at the market price because of inadequate market depth or 
market disruption.” According to the BCBS, funding liquidity risk is the risk that a bank will be impaired in its 
“ability to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due” and “at a reasonable cost.” Similar 
definitions are in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Market liquidity risk has become more significant as a 
result of securitization.   5
identifies the most severe scenario (or combination of scenarios), and the most vulnerable banks in the 
system.
2 Rychtarik and Stragiotti (2009) describe the liquidity position of Luxembourg banks using 
two different scores: across “peer” banks, and over time. Their framework identifies banks with 
weaker liquidity positions across 21 risk factors, and allows drawing conclusions on trends within the 
banking sector. This study represents a natural follow up of that work at the BCL. This research takes 
a stochastic approach to systemic liquidity stress testing, while being fully compatible with, and 
operational for, analyzing bank-level liquidity risk as well. It focuses on both market and funding 
liquidity risk, especially stress-testing the interbank market given its paramount importance in 
Luxembourg and the absence of this shock in the literature (likely due to the lack of episodes of this 
nature); uses industry and ECB-determined haircuts and run-off rates; includes banks’ reactions to the 
shocks; and incorporates the possibility of a drying up of funding from cross-border parent banks. It 
also simulates second–round, feedback effects as a result of joint banks’ reactions on asset prices and 
banks’ reputation. 
 
The next section has a selective literature review. Section III describes the model framework. Section 
IV, discusses the data, haircuts and run-off rates used. Section V explains the model simulations for 
Luxembourg banks of a systemic shock to the interbank market and a related-party withdrawal shock. 
Section VI concludes. Appendix A illustrates a traditional run-on-deposits shock. Appendix B 
performs a back-test of the simulated interbank liquidity shock. 
 
II.  Literature review 
 
While there are excellent surveys of systemic stress testing of banks (e.g., Quagliarello, ed., 2009), 
there is no survey of systemic liquidity risk stress testing of banks. The literature area to cover for that 
purpose is vast. This task is well beyond the objective of this paper. Instead, the remainder of the 
section contains a brief survey of recent theoretical and empirical work on selected topics relevant for 
liquidity stress testing. 
 
Macro liquidity risk encompasses several strands of literature. First, leverage and liquidity interaction 
have played an important role in the current crisis. Gromb and Vayanos (2008) model financial 
market liquidity as provided by financially constrained arbitrageurs who depend on external capital. 
Liquidity dry-ups follow periods of low returns for arbitrageurs' risky investment opportunities. The 
authors’ welfare analysis shows that arbitrageurs may fail to take socially optimal positions in their 
investments and provision of market liquidity because they fail to internalize the price effects of their 
investment decisions. Adrian and Shin (2008) suggest that in a financial system where balance sheets 
are continuously marked-to-market, asset price changes show up immediately as changes in net worth, 
and elicit responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. This 
                                                 
2 The explored scenarios are a run on a bank, the use of committed loans by counterparties, the netting of the 
bank’s position with the parent financial group, and changes in conditions of refinancing operations with the 
Eurosystem.   6
means that leverage and the strength of economic activity reinforce each other. Thus, aggregate 
liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of financial intermediaries. 
 
Second, liquidity hoarding has been another feature of banks’ behavior during the current crisis.  
Kobayashi et al (2008) observe that liquid lenders decreased their exposure or stayed out of the 
market as they feared that they might suffer from interim shocks, and that none would lend to them if 
a potential additional liquidity shortage arises. Instead, for Eisenshchmidt and Tapking (2009), banks 
hoard because of uncertainty about their own future needs and collateral shortages despite ample 
central bank liquidity supply. Acharya et al (2008) provide empirical evidence of banks’ predatory 
behavior during several banking crises. 
 
A third issue is markets’ incompleteness, and the implication that aggregate liquidity shocks cannot 
be hedged. For Allen and Gale (2005), system-wide liquidity needs cannot be satisfied at the 
fundamental value of assets in equilibrium, so prices have to fall to compensate liquidity holders for 
the cost of holding excess liquidity. Instead of looking at preferences, Diamond and Rajan (2005) 
show that in a general equilibrium framework early liquidation of long-term investments may not 
provide sufficient liquidity to ensure that all banks meet early claims, and thus, some banks fail. 
Fernando  et al (2008) provide an empirical assessment of market collapse due to an aggregate 
liquidity shock that result from the commonality of investors’ liquidity needs. 
 
Brunnermeir and Pedersen (2009) seminal paper links market and funding liquidity of traders, a fourth 
issue. During crises, decreases in market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing and 
produce liquidity spirals, which can be either margin spirals or loss spirals. Margin spirals occur when 
a decrease in funding compels a dealer to provide less market liquidity. If margins increase as market 
liquidity decreases, the initial decline in funding tightens the dealers’ funding constraint further, 
which in turn forces them to diminish their trading and so on, leading to a margin spiral. The loss 
spiral happens when a dealer who holds a security and faces a funding problem, tries to sell the 
security. In so doing, she reduces market liquidity and incurs losses that reinforce the initial problem. 
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) find strong empirical evidence that market liquidity is low when 
funding liquidity demands are high, and that this relationship only occurs in stressed conditions. 
 
A fifth topic is informational frictions which plague financial markets and are crucial to understand 
liquidity risk. Heider et al (2009) argue that credit risk is an important factor in explaining the recent 
breakdown of the interbank market. In their model, increased counterparty credit risk leads to higher 
interest rates in the money market, and asymmetric information may lead to adverse selection and 
eventually to a complete market breakdown. 
 
Another strand of literature is central bank’s willingness to provide liquidity as it has important 
implications for banks’ incentives. As liquid assets usually have lower returns than illiquid assets, 
holding liquid assets may have an opportunity cost in terms of foregone higher returns. In the   7
presence of an interbank market and asymmetric information, banks may rationally choose to hold 
lower levels of liquid assets and rely on other banks’ liquid asset holdings (Repullo, 2005). Cristensen 
et al (2009), using a yield curve model, find that central bank operations in the current crisis seemed 
to lower interbank market spreads. 
 
A seventh area is cross-jurisdictional issues. Given that liquidity supervision (and provision in the 
Euro area) is the responsibility of host countries, cross-jurisdictional issues matter for liquidity risk 
stressing. Countries have developed their own regime to ensure the liquidity of local entities. 
However, many international groups manage liquidity globally, and thus setting a common standard 
might help in reducing costs for international banks. This potential diversification benefit depends 
crucially on the actual dependence between the different shocks and the (legal) structure of the 
banking group. Schanz and Speller’s (2009) model highlights that in the case when markets know 
little about the subsidiaries’ insolvency risk, a regulator who wants to minimize the occurrence of 
liquidity shortages within her jurisdiction might want to require the subsidiary to hold a pool of liquid 
assets locally. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) find that the large global banks rely on internal capital 
markets with their foreign affiliates to help smooth domestic liquidity shocks. They show that the 
existence of such internal capital markets contributes to an international propagation of domestic 
liquidity shocks to affiliated banks abroad. 
 
Eight, models that provide micro foundations to the analysis of financial intermediaries, including 
endogenous reactions of banks and non-bank economic agents are in its infancy, and from an 
empirical viewpoint, they are still far from reflecting empirical regularities. Goodhart et al (2006) 
model is one such attempt; it assumes heterogeneous banks and investors, and develops endogenous 
feedback mechanisms and default. Liquidity is modelled via banks’ loan supply. 
 
Finally, with or without micro foundations, contagion models are relevant to understand the 
transmission of shocks in the interbank market. Contagion may happen via deposit withdrawals 
following depositors’ fear that banks will not be able to meet their obligations due to losses in the 
interbank market (Allen and Gale, 2000). Or, contagion can simply occur following defaults of 
interbank counterparties (von Peter, 2008), and be magnified by a financial accelerator (Adrian and 
Shin, 2007), or it may even result from settlement and payment systems failure. Upper (2007) surveys 
papers which apply counterfactual simulations to assess the danger of contagion given banks mutual 
credit exposures, but this has not yet been done for liquidity risk, except in van den End (2008). Boss 
et al (2006) model for market and credit risk stress testing is put into an interbank network and is used 
by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. Off-balance sheet contingencies are not included, and feedback 
effects arising from market and funding liquidity risks are also missing. Recently, Wong and Hui 
(2009) develop a liquidity stress testing framework where liquidity and default risk result from 
negative asset price shocks. This causes deposit outflows, a fall in market liquidity, and banks suffer 
from draw downs from their contingent credit lines. They model the effect of shocks on the default   8
risk of banks (using a Merton’s PD) and in banks’ deposit outflows. Contagion risk is incorporated via 
the interbank market. The model is applied to a sample of 27 Hong Kong banks. 
 
III.  The modelling framework 
 
The framework used in this paper to analyze systemic liquidity risk draws on the model developed at 
the De Nederlandsche Bank by J.W. van den End (2008), adapted to take into account Luxembourg 
idiosyncrasies. Therefore, only a succinct description of the model will follow. Importantly, the model 
is flexible enough to fulfil the requirement of both liquidity surveillance of individual market 
operators and of markets, as required by the Luxembourg Law of October 2008. It therefore can be 
used following a top-down or a bottom-up approach. 
 
The model encompasses market and funding liquidity risk in a macro stress-testing framework that 
uses balance sheet data. It takes into account the first and second-round (feedback) effects of shocks, 
including the price effects on markets following reactions of heterogeneous banks and idiosyncratic 
reputation effects—an illustration of Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) suggestion that market and 
funding liquidity risks are mutually reinforcing under stressed conditions. The model also allows the 
exploration of leverage and liquidity issues, and the implementation of interbank shocks due to banks’ 
hoarding. Importantly for Luxembourg and other international financial centres, the application of the 
model takes into consideration two cross-jurisdictional issues: it allows the interaction between parent 
and subsidiaries/branches via deposits, and it also incorporates currency risk via haircuts. A drawback 
of the model is that contagion lacks micro foundations: the effect of market shocks on banks’ default 
risk and deposit outflows is not modelled. Market stress caused by other economic developments is 
exogenous to the model. 
 
The model is set up to measure the impact of market and funding liquidity shocks on banks’ liquidity 
buffers.
3 Data availability makes possible to use the model only at a quarterly frequency.
4 Shocks are 
implemented via stochastic haircuts and run-off rates on assets and liabilities, respectively. As a result, 
stochastic liquidity buffers incorporate, at least partly, the possibility of rapid changes in asset values 
and contagion, the short-supply of stress situations data and their limited value
5, and proxy for 
uncertainty in the model parameters and banks’ reaction functions. To increase the model capacity to 
reflect the financial data behavior, Monte Carlo simulations of haircuts and run-off rates are 
performed using a log-normal distribution as it is consistent with the nonlinearities of liquidity stress 
occurrences, and it is the most widely used statistical distribution in asset pricing models and the risk 
                                                 
3 Liquid assets and liabilities are close, but not identical, to the ones considered by the banking sector supervisor, 
the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier, to determine the 30 percent prudential liquidity ratio. 
4 New reporting requirements will likely make possible to run the model at a monthly frequency and with a 
greater degree of granularity in the near future. 
5 The seizing up of the interbank market during the last crisis was widely unexpected. It is, to our knowledge, 
the first historical episode of that nature properly identified. This, together with the difficulty of defining a 
liquidity shock, makes it impossible to apply traditional historical simulation techniques.    9
management literature.
6 Therefore, in the simulations, the distribution for the draws is adjusted to 
reflect tail events, implemented by assuming three standard deviations. 
 
The model contains three stages, each of which is stochastic. The shock represents the first stage. 
Given that granular balance and off-balance sheet information is used, shocks can be implemented in 
a flexible way. Banks’ reactions to mitigate the impact of the shock on their liquidity buffers 
constitute the second stage. Those reactions, especially if quite generalized and similar, or if they 
result from large institutions’ actions, may have systemic consequences in the form of falls in asset 
price, increased margins calls, and more expensive funding. This, together with additional losses as a 
result of the interaction between liquidity risk and credit risk or to reputational effects, constitutes the 
third stage of the model. 
 
i.  First and second stages 
 
Bank b liquidity buffer in the baseline situation 0,










0 ,           ( 1 )  
 
the total stock of available liquid assets 
b
i I  for i = 1, … ,n. The liquidity buffer is made of cash, 
deposits at the BCL, ECB eligible collateral, liquid debt securities, listed shares, interbank assets 
available on demand, and money market funds available on demand.
7 The buffer
b B0 is intended to 
allow the bank to absorb the liquidity shock and to buy time to take measures, if necessary, to remain 
solvent. 
 
The liquidity shock in the model can happen via the asset side or the liability side of the on- balance 
and off-balance sheet of the bank. The shock to bank b,











i I are liquid asset and liability items of the bank b, and  i sim w , 1 _ are the stochastic weights 
associated with item i as a result of the first shock (recall that weights are assumed to come from 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Hull, J. C. (2003) and Aven (2003). 
7 See Tables 1 and 2 for the list of assets included in the buffer and the associated haircuts, as well as liquid 
liabilities and their associated and run-off rates, respectively.   10
stressed events at three standard deviations, or wi  ≈ 3 σ).
8  The liquidity buffer after the shock 
becomes







1 E B B − = .            ( 3 )  
 
There is in fact, a distribution of buffers associated with the distribution of stochastic weights. 
Following the shock, bank b has its buffer affected negatively and will take actions to restore it either 
because it must comply with regulatory measures, or because of liquidity management considerations. 






E , with θ estimated at 30 percent. 
The threshold value θ was estimated regressing the ranking of the one-period lagged changes in the 
baseline buffer as a result of the (e.g., interbank) shock on the ranking of changes in the balance sheet 
items with a rho Spearman correlation coefficient at the 99 percent confidence level.
9 This constitutes 
a proxy of the lack of information on the level of banks’ risk tolerance. 
 
When the bank reacts to restore its buffer, it is assumed that it can repo securities with the central 
bank, can sell liquid securities, and importantly in Luxembourg, draw liquidity from parent banks.
10 
Banks are assumed to be unable to finance themselves in the market affected by the shock.
11 It is also 
assumed that money market funds held by banks cannot be used by banks to react to the shock 
because of their relatively lower liquidity.
12  
 
Once a bank takes actions to restore its baseline buffer, the share of each balance sheet item j used 







j I I / ), reflecting the bank’s business model. The size of the transactions that a bank conducts 
with instrument j is expressed by
b
j RI ,  
 
                                                 
8 Monte Carlo simulations of haircuts and run-off rates are performed by taking 50,000 draws from a log-normal 
distribution. In the simulations, the distribution is adjusted to reflect tail events, or three standard deviations. 
The log normal distribution used is: Exp [(N (0,1)*(weights (i)/3) ], subject to the constraint that haircuts and 
run-offs rates ≤ 1. 
9 The relatively low frequency of the data available clearly limits this part of the analysis. It can be argued that 
three months is sufficiently long a period to accommodate not only banks’ responses to the shock that reduced 
their buffers, but also the result of asset price changes and bank asset-liability management operations unrelated 
to the shock. However, estimation by IV of the coefficient of changes in the baseline buffer and balance sheet 
items does not change the conclusions dramatically. 
10 Obviously, an area where the model can be improved is by modeling the reaction function of banks explicitly. 
The choice of assets and liabilities that banks use to replenish their buffers may be the outcome of contingency 
funding plans or of liquidity management operations. 
11 This is different from van den End (2008). Results would improve without this restriction. 
12 Money market funds held as investment represent a small part of the balance sheet of Luxembourg banks.   11








j I I B B RI .        ( 4 )  
 
Following the bank’s reaction, the new buffer is B2, and as 
b
j RI is positive, B1 ≤ B2. In addition, B2 < 
B0, since the buffer can not be fully restored due to the shock in the first stage (as reflected in 
w_sim1,j). Therefore, 
b
j RI   refers to the size of the transactions required to generate the liquidity 
needed after the shock. The liquidity buffer after the mitigating actions (B2) of a bank is: 
 





b b sim w RI B B − × + = ∑ ,        ( 5 )  
 
with B2 > B1, The flexibility of the model allows to shut down and open up quite easily different 
sources of funding and market liquidity. For example, as explained above, following an interbank 
market shock, this source of funding disappears altogether. In that case, w_sim1,j = 1, implying that 
banks have no possibility to enter the interbank market as the haircut is 100 percent. Alternatively, in 






ii.  Third stage 
 
The third stage illustrates the effects on banks’ buffers of banks’ reactions on market prices and 
banks’ reputation. In the literature, these are normally referred to as feedback effects and endogenous 
parameter variance (Sorge, 2004). In the model, it is implemented as further haircuts and run-off rates, 
i.e., w_sim1,j ≤ w_sim2,j ≤ 1. Feedback effects are larger if more banks react so that (∑
b
q) is relatively 
larger, and if their reactions are more similar (∑
b
b
j RI ). For example, transactions in the large 
interbank market will have relatively less effects, i.e., w_sim2,i is relatively smaller than in the case of 
transactions in relatively more illiquid markets. Therefore,  
 
















j j j q s RI RI q sim w sim w / ) / 1 ( ^ _ _ , 1 , 2 .    (6) 
 
Higher values of 
b
j RI  reflect a higher liquidity demand; so, relatively larger transactions will have 
more impact on prices than small transactions. Similarly, relatively larger banks will have stronger   12
feedback effects than small banks. As in Nier et al (2008), the price of banking assets is a decreasing 
function of the amount of liquidated assets and the semi-elasticity of the price effects (a measure of 
market illiquidity). Therefore, equation (6) reflects market illiquidity through the weights 
( j sim w , 2 _ ).  
 
In addition, banks’ reactions also affect more or less asset prices depending on prevailing market 
conditions: asset prices will fall less, ceteris paribus, when the exogenous level of market stress, s, is 
lower than when it is higher.
 13 Stressful market conditions magnify the negative price effects of the 
number of banks that react (∑
b








j RI RI ) /  as both 
factors tend to dry up market liquidity. 
 
An additional effect of banks’ reactions to restore their liquidity buffers is on their reputation via 
signalling effects (Holstrom, 2008, BIS, 2009a) and the well known stigma of central bank borrowing 
(e.g., Furfine, 2001). These forces increase haircuts on assets and run-off rates on liabilities; and this 
is represented in the model as w_sim*2,j (with w_sim2,j  ≤ w_sim*2,j  ≤ 1).   
Again, the reputation effect will be dependent on the market conditions (s) driving the feedback 
effects via signalling under asymmetric information. Reputation risk is expressed as follows: 
 
s sim w sim w j j × = , 2
*
, 2 _ _ .          ( 7 )  
 
Finally, the feedback effects of the third stage without reputation consequences are reflected by
b E2 : 
 







b sim w sim w RI I E − × + =∑ ,       ( 8 )  
 
with w_sim*2,j rather than w_sim2,j if banks suffer from reputation effects. The liquidity buffer after 







3 E B B − = .            ( 9 )  
 
The model does not take into account any reaction from the monetary authority which could mitigate 
the impact of the shock.  
 
                                                 
13 Endogenizing market stress would be preferable. This would be part and parcel of giving microeconomic 
foundations to banks’ reaction functions, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the use of 
stochastic haircuts offsets, at least partly, this deficiency.   13
IV. Data,  haircuts  and run-off rates 
 
The composition and measurement of the liquidity buffer play a central role in this stress testing 
exercise. This is consistent with van den End (2008) and the literature on stress testing liquidity risk 
(BIS 2009a, ECB 2008). The definition of the buffer follows the balance-sheet approach to stress 
testing. The quarterly database covers 52 banks for the period 2006Q1-2009Q3; as of 2009Q3, the 
sample represents nearly 90 percent of total bank assets. In contrast to the De Nederlansche Bank, 
there is no information on 1-quarter banks’ liquidity projections and gaps. Therefore, flows are 
projected assuming that balance sheet items follow random walk generating processes.
14 This means 
that the scenario effects could be felt through both deteriorating liquid stocks and flows. Each balance 
sheet item is evaluated according to a homogeneous set of haircuts, applicable to each financial 
instrument of the same type (e.g., listed shares, debt instruments, funds) and featuring the same 
economic characteristics (i.e., currency, country of origin, type of counterparty). Importantly, 
measurement of assets included in the buffer acknowledges that the same kind of asset may enjoy 
different liquidity characteristics depending on the currency of denomination.
15 
 
The liquidity buffer is a portfolio of high quality, highly liquid unencumbered securities as defined in 
the BIS, 2009b guidelines; those guidelines are also followed for the definition of the haircuts and 
run-off rates.
16 As a result, several components of banks’ portfolios are withdrawn, such as unlisted 
shares, shareholding participations, and debt instruments issued by entities located in countries 
excluded from Tables 1 and 2. Overall, however, the buffer used in this paper is more conservative 
than what is being proposed in the BIS, 2009b.
17  The most significant off-balance sheet items 
included are committed credit lines. Derivatives held by banks in Luxembourg are not included in this 
study. As a result, the definition and measurement of the buffer aligns the model not only with 
Luxembourg idiosyncrasies, but also with current work in several fora in the field of macro-prudential 
supervision and banks’ liquidity risk management. 
 
The definition and measurement of the buffer are constrained by the available data quality and time 
span. The BCL reporting database used for this study encompasses several dimensions.
18 Included 
                                                 
14 This is equivalent to taking the last observation of the 5397 lines of banks’ buffers. The forecast function of 
the random walk process t t t y y ε + = −1 is flat; it is t t t y y E = +1 . 
15 The model is flexible enough to be used for an exchange rate shock. This is not done in this study, however. 
16 Available unencumbered assets are marketable as collateral in secondary markets and/or eligible for central 
banks’ standing facilities.  
17 As an illustration, in the BIS document, securities with effective remaining maturities of less than one year 
have a zero percent haircut (in the BIS terminology, a “required stable funding factor”), while in this paper, their 
haircuts oscillate between 2.5 percent and 90 percent, depending on the country of issuance, the currency of 
denomination, and the type of counterparty. 
18  For a more extensive explanation of the type of counterparties and balance sheet items included in the 
definition of the liquidity buffer, see:  
http://www.bcl.lu/fr/statistiques/methodo_notes/methodology_statistics.pdf, and 
http://www.bcl.lu/fr/reporting/Etablissements_de_credit/index.html.   14
balance sheet items are debt instruments, listed shares, money market funds, and cash. Types of 
counterparties for debt instruments are banks, non  financial institutions (e.g., corporate, holding 
companies, other private sector entities), central government (governmental institutions, central and 
regional governmental institutions such as the German Republic or the Land of Bavaria), supra-
national organizations (international organizations, e.g., the European Investment Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund). There is no counterparty discrimination for listed shares. Geopolitical 
counterparty classifications are: for debt instruments, Eurozone countries (non European Economic 
Area), G10 non Eurozone countries, European Economic Area (no Eurozone), other countries. And 
for listed shares, they are Eurozone, United States, Japan, AAA foreign currency rating countries.
19 
The categorized currencies of issuance of financial instruments are the Euro, the United States Dollar, 
the Japanese Yen, and AAA foreign currency rating (e.g., Swiss Franc, Norwegian Krone, Singapore 
Dollar). If available, residual maturities are preferred to contractual maturities.
20 Haircuts apply to 
each possible combination of type, counterparty, geopolitical origin, currency of issuance and 
maturity are on Table 1.  
 
                                                 
19 The foreign currency ratings were derived from the website of Standard & Poor’s (2009); an updated version 
is in http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245202906346. 
20 The BCL reporting allows banks to report the residual maturities according to a set of predefined time 
buckets, namely below 1 year, between 1 and 2 years, longer than 2 years, and unspecified maturity. These 
maturity buckets may not completely fit this study needs in terms of liquidity risk assessment of a given item of 
the balance sheet. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, these buckets seem sufficient for determining the haircuts 
applicable to the buffers.    15
Table 1- Liquidity buffer: haircuts applied to selected balance sheet items 
  TYPE OF BS ITEM TYPE OF ISSUER CURRENCY OF ISSUANCE COUNTRY OF ISSUANCE <1 year 1<year<2 year>2 unspecified
listed stocks EUR EUROAREA n/a n/a n/a 50%
USD US n/a n/a n/a 50%
JPY JAPAN n/a n/a n/a 50%
AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING n/a n/a n/a 50%
EUR EUROAREA n/a n/a n/a 50%
USD US n/a n/a n/a 50%
JPY JAPAN n/a n/a n/a 50%
AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING n/a n/a n/a 50%
Debt financial instruments credit institution  EUR EUROAREA 20% 30% 40% 50%
G10 (NON EEA)  30% 40% 50% 60%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 40% 50% 60% 70%
USD EUROAREA 30% 40% 50% 60%
G10 (NON EEA)  40% 50% 60% 70%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 50% 60% 70% 80%
JPY EUROAREA 30% 40% 50% 60%
G10 (NON EEA)  40% 50% 60% 70%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 50% 60% 70% 80%
AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING EUROAREA 50% 60% 70% 80%
G10 (NON EEA)  60% 70% 80% 90%
Debt financial instruments non financial institutions EUR EUROAREA 40% 50% 60% 70%
G10 (NON EEA)  50% 60% 70% 80%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 60% 70% 80% 90%
USD EUROAREA 50% 60% 70% 80%
G10 (NON EEA)  60% 70% 80% 90%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 70% 80% 90% 100%
JPY EUROAREA 50% 60% 70% 80%
G10 (NON EEA)  60% 70% 80% 90%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 70% 80% 90% 100%
AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING EUROAREA 70% 80% 90% 100%
G10 (NON EEA)  80% 90% 100% 100%
Debt financial instruments Government  EUR EUROAREA 2,5% 5,0% 7,5% 10,0%
G10 (NON EEA)  5,0% 7,5% 10,0% 12,5%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 7,5% 10,0% 12,5% 15,0%
X1 70,0% 80,0% 90,0% 100,0%
USD EUROAREA 5,0% 7,5% 10,0% 12,5%
G10 (NON EEA)  7,5% 10,0% 12,5% 15,0%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 10,0% 12,5% 15,0% 17,5%
X1 80,0% 90,0% 100,0% 100,0%
JPY EUROAREA 5,0% 7,5% 10,0% 12,5%
G10 (NON EEA)  7,5% 10,0% 12,5% 15,0%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 10,0% 12,5% 15,0% 17,5%
X1 80,0% 90,0% 100,0% 100,0%
AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING EUROAREA 7,5% 10,0% 12,5% 15,0%
G10 (NON EEA)  10,0% 12,5% 15,0% 17,5%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 12,5% 15,0% 17,5% 20,0%
X1 90,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Money market funds  Credit institution  EUR EUROAREA n/a n/a n/a 50%
USD US n/a n/a n/a 60%
JPY JAPAN n/a n/a n/a 60%
AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING AAA FOREIGN CCY RATING n/a n/a n/a 70%
Cash  All sectors All currencies All countries 0% 0% 0% 0%
RESIDUAL MATURITY - HAIRCUTS
 
 
Haircuts are based on banks’ practice in Luxembourg (Rychtarik, 2009, Stragiotti, 2009), industry 
standards (Standard & Poor’s, 2007), ECB requirements (ECB, 2006) and also judgement. For 
instance, the matrix of haircuts stresses the relevance of information on geopolitical as well as 
macroeconomic data; the country of origin and the currency of each financial instrument play a 
significant role in the evaluation of haircuts. However, given that the available reporting does not 
discriminate across types of securities (e.g., callable bonds versus bonds held to maturity), some 
simplifications are necessary. 
 
A haircut does not depend always on the type of security. For instance, no distinction is made between 
the haircuts of asset-backed securities and corporate bonds issued in the same currency by the same 
type of entity, in the same country. This issue becomes somehow less relevant if put in the context of 
the approach taken, which is partly inspired by the ECB implementation of monetary policy 
operations. Indeed, for the latter, the type of financial instrument becomes less relevant regarding the 
eligibility criteria. 
 
The BCL reporting distinguishes four types of maturities. In this context, several hypotheses have to 
be made. It is not feasible to always distinguish across different securities based on their maturities.   16
For example, within the category of debt instruments with a maturity below 1 year, it is not possible 
to determine what amount represents commercial paper and what amount represents other financial 
instruments. However, this classification is useful as a proxy for the degree of liquidity of the 
instruments.  
 
The same framework supports the determination of run-off rates. These rates are set to reflect several 
facets of potential liquidity shocks of systemic and idiosyncratic nature. The run-off rates are based on 
(1) historical observation of past shocks in the Luxembourg banking sector; (2) the same practice and 
literature references used for haircuts and; (3) information received from surveys sent to banks. Table 
2 displays the run-off rates of balance sheet items relevant for the shocks simulated in this study.
21 
 
Table 2 - Run-off rates applied to selected stressed balance sheet items 
 
TYPE OF BS ITEM TYPE OF ISSUER CURRENCY OF ISSUANCE COUNTRY OF ISSUANCE <1 year 1<year<2 year>2 unspecified
Deposits - retail - Luxembourg all currencies all geopolitical areas 20%
Deposits - retail  - non Luxembourg all currencies all geopolitical areas 20%
Deposits - corporate - all all currencies all geopolitical areas 50%
Deposits - banks - non Related Parties all currencies all geopolitical areas 65%
Fiduciary deposits - banks 1Y all currencies all geopolitical areas 90%
TYPE OF BS ITEM TYPE OF ISSUER CURRENCY OF ISSUANCE COUNTRY OF ISSUANCE <1 year 1<year<2 year>2 unspecified
Interbank deposits  Credit institution all currencies EUROAREA 10% 30% 50% 70%
G10 (NON EEA)  20% 40% 60% 80%
EEA (NO EUROAREA) 20% 40% 60% 80%
Liabilities
Assets
RESIDUAL MATURITY - RUN-OFF RATES










V.  Simulation results  
 
i.  Choice of the shocks and calibration of market stress 
 
The macro stress test exercise covers several aspects of market and funding liquidity risk. The 
following shocks test the resilience of the Luxembourg banking sector. First, a systemic shock to 
interbank loans is assumed to affect the whole banking sector. The entire stock of interbank loans 
undergoes a severe, albeit plausible stress. Effects on a selected set of banks are also discussed. 
Second, related-party deposits suffer a withdrawal shock. The choice of these shocks is based on the 
importance of the interbank market in Luxembourg, and the fact that most banks are subsidiaries or 
branches of large foreign banks.  
                                                 
21  Money market fund’s deposits are excluded from the table because they are held mostly, albeit not 
exclusively, by custodian banks. The practice of these banks in Luxembourg seems to exclude these funds from 
their maturity transformation activity. The BCL database does not allow a distinction between custodian and 
non-custodian banks (Rychtarik and Stragiotti, 2009, take a different approach, not followed in this paper, and 
assume as scenario a potential withdrawal of deposits from funds). Note that run-off rates do not refer to 
intraday liquidity risk, the main risk custodian banks face.   17
 
The interbank market (lending or deposits) represents about 50 percent of banks’ total assets (Figure 
1). The share has been quite stable over the sample period, although during the crisis there was a fall 
in the ratio of interbank lending to total assets. In addition, interbank lending to related parties, while 
traditionally high, increased recently, most likely the result of accrued liquidity needs of parent banks. 
 
Figure 1 – Importance of the interbank market in Luxembourg 
 
 
Out of a total of 143 banks, only 27 banks do not lend to related parties, and 35 banks make more than 
50 percent of their interbank lending to related parties (Figure 2). In fact, more than 80 percent of the 
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Figure 2 – Lending to related parties 
 
 
These structural factors of the banking system justify not only the choice of the shocks, but also the 
calibration of the parameter s, a proxy for market stress, an important component of the second-round 
effects of shocks. Market stress is, therefore, exogenous to the model. The implied stock volatility 
index (VIX) and the Merrill option volatility index (MOVE) can be used as proxies of risk aversion. 
However, the share of stocks and non-related party debt is relatively small in banks’ buffers relative to 
the share of related-party loans and deposits. And related-party loans and deposits are relatively more 
stable (Figure 3). If the standardized distributions of the indices VIX and MOVE were used, normal 
market conditions (represented by -1≤  s  ≤ 1) would comprise about 70 percent of total market 
conditions, and in the tail of the distributions, s = 3, would represent about 4 percent of adverse 
market situations. Using related-party loans standardized distribution of volatility, normal market 
conditions would still represent 70 percent of the total, but at s = 3, no adverse market conditions 
would be found.
22 As a result, the simulations use a baseline value of s = 1.1 and show the sensitivity 
of the interbank shock to the value of s by making s reach 1.5.
23  
 
                                                 
22 The CGFS (2010) study "Funding Patterns and Liquidity Management of Internationally Active Banks" has 
found that, during the recent crisis, reputation concerns led international banking groups to support troubled 
subsidiaries beyond their contractual obligations. 
23 The value of 1.1 for s is the weighted average of market stress using as weights the share or bonds/shares and 
related-party deposits in the system liquidity buffer, i.e., 17 percent and 83 percent with values of 1.5 and 1, 
respectively. A value for s of 1.5 instead, would result from making s for bonds/shares equal to 2 and s for 
related-party deposits equal to 1.4. These are perhaps implausible events, but are shown here to illustrate the 
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Figure 3 – VIX, MOVE  and related-party loans volatility frequency distributions 




Market conditions determine the severity of the second-round effects, as shown in equation (6). 
Figures 4 and 5 display the relationship between the weights used for the second-round effects,   
j sim w , 2 _ , and the weights used for the first round effects  j sim w , 1 _ . As explained in section III, the 
similarity of banks’ reactions has a stronger effect on market conditions than the number of reacting 
banks, a typical crowding out effect. Similarly, the signaling effects of banks’ use of central bank’s 
refinancing facilities (as illustrated by the recent crisis), is a factor explaining the increase in haircuts 
and run-off rates during the second round of the simulations. In addition, the sensitivity analysis 
displayed in Figures 4 and 5, which includes data from the crisis, suggests that using a value of s > 1.5 
has little justification in the Luxembourg banking sector situation. As a result, reputation effects 
would have only a small impact on haircuts and run-off rates and are not included (see equation (7)). 
In a more general framework, however, reputation effects on parent banks could be considered. This 
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Figure 4 – Second-round haircuts multiplication factor  j j sim w sim w , 1 , 2 _ / _ and the number of 
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Figure 5 – Second-round haircuts multiplication factor  j j sim w sim w , 1 , 2 _ / _ and relative reaction by 
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ii.  First shock: systemic shock to interbank loans 
 
In the first shock, each bank loses part of the value of its interbank loans. The static part of the loss is 
set by the weight/haircut matrix on Table 1. The shock hits all the banks carrying these types of 
exposure. In this type of shock, the interest is not in the outcomes for individual banks, but rather on 
the banking sector as a whole (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 - Systemic shock to interbank loans: shock, system response and second-round effects 
 
 
The chart displays the impact of the systemic shock on banks’ buffers (Bb1), standardized by the 
baseline liquidity buffer Bb0.
24 The impact of the banking sector’s response function as well as the 
second-round effects are also represented on the chart (respectively, Bb2 and Bb3). The ordinate 
displays the corresponding frequencies. The largest potential loss incurred by the Luxembourg 
banking sector after the occurrence of the interbank shock would be around 36 percent of the baseline 
buffer  Bb0.
 25  As stated above, most Luxembourg banks are subsidiaries or branches of foreign 
banking groups and play an important role in the financing of the group. The results are thus 
consistent with the fact that banks’ major source of financing is the interbank market. 
 
Following the shock, banks are supposed to react, for example, by using securities for repo operations 
with the central bank or by selling securities. Absent a micro-foundation of banks’ reactions, the 
extent to which banks use a particular item of their portfolio to restore the baseline liquidity buffer is 
                                                 
24 The baseline or initial buffer equals one, i.e., Bb0 = 1. Bb1 buffers are calculated by subtracting the first-
round effects of the shock from the baseline buffer. 
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determined by the relative importance of the item in the balance sheet, which is obviously a reflection 
of each bank’s business line (equations 4 and 5). Bb2 describes the buffers’ distribution after the 
banking sector takes mitigating actions.
26 The buffer Bb2 is, therefore, the result of adding to the set 
of buffers Bb1, the transactions performed by banks as shock mitigating actions. After its reaction, the 
banking sector is better off and is expected to be left in a worse case scenario with roughly 66 percent 
(Bb2) of its baseline buffer. This implies a potential loss of about 2 percentage points. Moreover, the 
associated frequencies indicate that the recovery is in general more likely. 
 
Bb3 is the buffer after second-round effects and highlights the maximum potential loss of the banking 
sector after idiosyncratic and reputation effects are taken into account (equations 6 to 9).
27 This leads 
to a general worsening of the liquidity position of individual banks (and of the banking sector as a 
whole). Indeed, banks forced to liquidate part of (or the entire stock) their buffers to fulfill their 
financial obligations will generate an increase in the volatility of assets included in their liquidity 
buffers and their associated haircuts. As illustrated on Figure 6, second-round effects have a large 
impact on the banking sector: after repeated sampling, on average, the banking sector will suffer a 
further loss of 16 percentage points (relative to the buffer after reaction, Bb2). 
 
Importantly for systemic risk analysis, the 5 percent of the tail of the distribution shows that the 
banking system losses more than a quarter of its baseline buffer; this figures raises to as much as 36 
percent at the 1 percent of the tail of the distribution (Table 3).
28 There is only one bank that finishes 
with a negative liquidity buffer. A measure of systemic liquidity risk, i.e., the weighted average of 
negative liquidity buffers is very low, 0.002 percent, given that the troubled bank is small. 
 
The simulation results for the systemic shock to interbank loans when market conditions are already 
turbulent, represented here by an (exogenous) higher s equal to 1.5, are significantly worse. At the 5 
percent of the tail of the distribution, the systemic buffer loss after the second-round effects is over 60 
percent and at the 1 percent of the tail of the distribution it increases to almost 70 percent. There are 
14 banks that risk having a negative baseline buffer, at least for some tail realizations of the shock. 
Systemic risk rises to 0.6 percent.  
 
                                                 
26 Only banks suffering at least a 30 percent loss of their baseline buffers are supposed to react; they represent 
71 percent of the sample. The 30 percent threshold was estimated regressing the ranking of the 
contemporaneous changes in the baseline buffer as a result of the (interbank) shock on the ranking of changes in 
the balance sheet items for a rho Spearman correlation coefficient at the 99 percent confidence level. This is 
used as a proxy for the lack of knowledge of banks’ risk tolerance levels. 
27  Reputation effects are not taken into consideration in the simulations because as discussed below, the 
Luxembourg banks’ buffers have a dominant share of related parties’ items. It is not immediately clear what a 
“reputation effect” would mean in this case. As experienced during the recent crisis, parent companies extended 
credit lines to their subsidiaries in most cases.  
28 As a reference, in the DNB liquidity stress testing exercise of Dutch banks, the baseline buffer loss following 
a credit shock is 7.5 percent and following a banking crisis is about 13.7 percent.   23
Table3  - Summary results of the systemic shock to interbank loans 
(million Euros, unless otherwise indicated) 
s=1,1 s=1,5
15 016 --
Buffer after shock 12 250 --
Buffer after mitigating actions 12 284 --
Buffer after second round effects 11 074 5 781
     Percent loss wrt initial buffer -26 -61
Buffer @ 5 percent tail 10 828 4 800
     Percent loss wrt initial buffer -28 -68
Buffer @ 1 percent tail 9 563 3 864
     Percent loss wrt initial buffer -36 -74
Number of banks with negative buffer 1 14
System liquidity risk (weighted, percent) 0,002 0,554
Initial buffer
Number of reacting banks = 37 Total number of banks = 52
 
 
However, shock results differ across banks. One major reason is the composition of banks’ buffers, in 
turn largely a function of banks’ business lines. The exercise has systemic relevance by making clear 
that banks’ business lines and interactions are quite diverse in Luxembourg.
29 As a result, systemic 
stress-testing must be done in a framework that is flexible enough to accommodate them. Three banks 
selected according to their relative importance, their business profile, and their sensitivity to the 











                                                 
29 See analysis of banks’ business lines in Luxembourg in Rychtarik and Stragiotti (2009), Box 1. Aggregation 
of simulation results by business lines is problematic.   24


























































Bank A is mostly a retail bank with important interbank volumes on the assets’ side of its balance 
sheet, representing about 38 percent of the initial buffer. Bank B is active in several business lines (i.e., 
retail, custody, corporate, among the most important ones); its interbank/buffer ratio is 30 percent. 
Bank C is mainly a global custodian, active in the field of services to investors with an 
interbank/buffer ratio of 33 percent. Bank A experiences the largest potential impact following the 
interbank shock. Indeed, its expected buffer in a worst case scenario would be roughly 66 percent of 
its baseline buffer. Taking remedial actions, bank A would recover roughly 20 percentage points of its 
baseline buffer loss. Second-round effects affect severely the baseline buffer as bank A experiences a 
further loss slightly over 30 percentage points, if compared to the buffer after the shock’s response 
(Bb2). Bank B and C are less affected by the interbank shock as they are expected to maintain 72 
percent and 68 percent of their baseline buffers, respectively, after the shock. After reacting, bank B 
would recover roughly 18 percentage points of its baseline buffer loss, and bank C would recover 20 
percentage points of its baseline buffer loss. The impact of second-round effects on these two banks 
would imply an expected further reduction of their Bb2 buffers of 28 percentage points. Any 
differences across banks can be explained by the different composition of their portfolios, and 
therefore, their corresponding simulated haircuts.  
 
iii.  First shock, systemic shock to interbank loans, excluding related-party deposits 
 
Given the paramount role of related-party deposits in banks’ buffers, it is useful to discuss the effects 
of the interbank shock when banks reacting to the shock cannot avail themselves of related-party 
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   26
severe loss increases; in Bb2¸the largest potential loss rises to roughly 46 percent from 34 percent 
previously. These results highlight the critical role of related parties in the local banking sector. As 
regards second-round effects, they do not play a role in the context of shocks affecting or originating 
from related parties transactions. The reason is the specific haircuts that these items receive in our 
framework, as they are considered fully eligible in all circumstances (haircuts are equal to 0 for each 
and every related parties’ item).
30  
 
Figure 8 - Systemic shock to interbank loans: shock, banks’ responses, excluding related parties 
 
 
iv.  Second shock: related parties’ withdrawal shock 
 
Given that well over one-third of Luxembourg banks’ liabilities are intra-group, this shock is very 
relevant to assess the survival capacity of Luxembourg banks. In this scenario, related entities 
withdraw their deposits, an important share of banks’ funding. Results of the shock on two banks’ 
buffers are displayed on Figure 9. The two selected banks are bank D, with related-parties’ deposits 
representing 22 percent of its baseline buffer, and bank E, with related-parties deposits representing 
55 percent of its buffer. 
 
This shock potentially accounts for a loss of 22 percent of bank D’s baseline buffer and 40 percent of 
bank E’s.
31 On average, banks’ reaction does not allow the banks to recover much of the loss incurred 
                                                 
30 See footnote 22. 
31 Bank D’s results are shown for illustrative purposes as the shock would not prompt a bank’s reaction given 
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during the shock. Bank D can recover about 8 percentage points of its initial loss, and bank E can 
recover just 4 percentage points.  
 


















































Bb1 buffer after shock  Bb2 buffer after bank's reaction Bb3 buffer after second round effects  28
Second-round effects significantly impact both banks. Bank D loses 24 percentage points of its Bb2 
buffer, and ends up with a buffer just above 60 percent of its baseline value. Bank E loses 15 
percentage points of its Bb2 buffer and ends up with 48 percent of its baseline buffer. These results 
show the potentially severe impact that the withdrawal of intra-group positions of Luxembourg banks 
can have given their strong reliance on this source of funding. 
 
VI.  Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper is a study of market and funding liquidity stress testing of the Luxembourg banking sector. 
Liquidity shocks are instrumented using stochastic haircuts and run-off rates. The modeling 
framework is flexible enough to deal with systemic and individual banks’ shocks. It includes not only 
the shock and banks’ reactions to mitigate the effects of the shocks on their liquidity buffers—first 
and second stages—but also the endogenous effects on banks’ buffers of banks’ collective actions and 
their impact on asset prices—third stage. 
 
A shock to the interbank market and a shock to related-party deposits of Luxembourg banks illustrate 
that banks’ business lines are important in shaping the net effect of the shocks on banks’ stochastic 
liquidity buffers. Related parties play a fundamental role in banks’ reactions to shocks. Systemic 
second-round effects seem to play a less important role than first round effects, although results vary 
widely across banks, and for certain banks, the opposite is true. Second-round effects should be taken 
into account because by affecting asset prices they diminish the benefits of diversification and can 
more than offset banks’ mitigating actions. In addition, they illustrate how contagion may operate, 
independently of the correlation between a given shock, and business line and buffer composition. 
Overall, however, using as measure of systemic liquidity risk the weighted average of negative 
liquidity buffers, systemic liquidity risk is low even under severe stress conditions. 
 
Given the large number of subsidiaries of complex banking groups in Luxembourg, the results suggest 
the importance of monitoring the liquidity of parent groups, especially when liquidity management is 
centralized and funding decentralized.
32  This is consistent with a major lesson from the recent 
financial crisis: understanding financial stability is impossible without a proper understanding of 
international banking activities.  
 
Results also indicate the importance of system-wide measures to minimize the systemic effects of 
liquidity shocks, both ex-ante and ex-post, such as sound liquidity management frameworks and 
contingency plans, robust liquidity buffers, and deposit insurance. The study illustrates an important 
macro-prudential tool to enhance the understanding of the interaction between liquidity and financial 
                                                 
32 See CGFS (2010) for a description of liquidity management and funding practices of internationally active 
banks.   29
stability. It provides a framework to produce quantitative judgments on systemic risk and financial 
stability.  
 
The development of macro-prudential elements of financial stability policy is in its infancy. Much 
remains to be done in terms of refining the theory and the operational aspects of frameworks for 
liquidity stress testing. Regarding this paper framework, one important area for improvement would 
be endogenizing banks’ reactions to shocks. Similarly, the modeling framework should make explicit 
the transmission mechanism of shocks within the financial sector and between the financial and the 
real sector. For instance, liquidity shocks can adversely affect banks’ risk default, which can further 
restrict access to liquidity, as it was observed at the beginning of the crisis. Linking both risks in a 
model of the banking sector could advance the understanding of systemic risk. From the operational 
viewpoint, the matrix of haircuts could be made still more granular to allow a distinction between 
secured- and unsecured-market pleadgeable assets, or among different proxies of market stress 
depending on the country of location of parent banks’ headquarters. Finally, as required by the law 
making the BCL responsible for the liquidity surveillance of markets, the work should be extended in 
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Appendix A: A run-on-deposits shock 
 
The shock on deposits is a very severe event for bank A and a moderately severe event for bank B. 
The outcome is due to the fact that both banks rely on funding from retail and corporate clients, but to 
quite a different degree. The shares of deposits shocked represent 88 percent and 37 percent of bank 
A’s and bank B’s baseline buffers, respectively.
33 These results are shown in Figure A1. 
 
The shock on bank A’s deposits has an important impact on its buffer: the bank is expected to lose 
potentially up to 47 percent of its liquidity buffer after the shock. The bank’s response improves its 
buffer allowing it to recover 30 percentage points. 
 









                                                 
33 More specifically, the main difference between these two banks is the large amount of related-party deposits 




























Although bank B does not lose up to 30 percent of their baseline buffer, its reaction is shown here for 
illustrative purposes. Bank B, whose largest potential loss equals 19 percent of its baseline buffer, has 
quite a different profile from bank A. Following the bank’s mitigating actions, bank B recovers up to 
13 percentage points of its baseline buffer so that is left with a loss of 6 percent. 
 
Second-round effects also have different effects on banks’ buffers, but less so, given that they operate 
via a generalized increase in market volatility and wide-spread asset price changes. Banks A and B 
end up with a buffer that is 57 percent and 79 percent of their baseline buffers, respectively. Second-
round effects are important enough to more than offset banks’ mitigating actions following the shock. 
While banks’ business lines matter for the severity of the impact of the shock and the offsetting 
effects of banks’ mitigating actions, second-round effects affect banks more generally. For example, a 
custodian bank (not shown here), for which a deposit shock will not matter much in terms of buffer 
losses, is left with 80 percent of its baseline buffer as a result of second-round effects. These results 
clearly illustrate how contagion may operate and thus, the relevance of measures to minimize the risk 
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Appendix B: A simple back-test of the interbank liquidity shock 
 
As stated above, the lack of historical episodes when the interbank market seized up makes it 
impossible to apply traditional historical simulation techniques. However, the robustness of the results 
has to be assessed in some way. Here, a simple back-test of the simulation results of the interbank 
liquidity shock is implemented by analyzing the behaviour of the Luxembourg banking system 
liquidity buffer during the period 2008:Q4-2009:Q3, characterized by the seizing up of the interbank 
market. As shown on Table B1, during 2008:Q4, the liquidity buffer of the banking system fell two 
thirds (about half) of the all simulated by the model following the first-round effects (second-round 
effects) of an interbank shock using s=1.1. After three quarters, the model first-round effects largely 
coincide with the actual outcomes, and after one year, the actual fall in the system liquidity buffer is 
larger than what exudes from the model second-round effects.  
 
Model s=1,1 Model s=1,5
One quarter After two quarters After three quarters After one year
Buffer after shock -18,4 -
Buffer after mitigating actions -18,2 -
Buffer after second-round effects -26,3 -61,5 -11,6 -14,1 -17,0 -28,8
Buffer @ 5 percent tail -27,9 -68,0
Buffer @ 1 percent tail -36,3 -74,3




The actual outcomes are, therefore, not as large as simulated in the short run. After a year, however, 
the effects are similar; but it is fair to say that during that more extended period of time other 
consequences of the shock, both in the financial sector and in the real economy, would have played 
their role too. So, although less significant than the disparity of results between the credit shock and 
the actual outcomes in the case of the Netherlands (van den End, 2008), the model still shows an 
upward bias. This may result from wrong assumptions regarding the number of reacting banks or 
regarding the set of actions available to banks following the shock, or it is also possible that banks’ 
liquidity buffers reflect valuation changes with a lag. However, the disparity between the model 
simulations and the actual outcome, even in the quarter the simulations refer to, seems largely due to 
the exclusion of central bank liquidity provisions from the analysis. Since the beginning of the crisis, 
the BCE significantly broadened the universe of acceptable collateral for open market operations and 
conducted them at a fixed rate, making haircuts de facto lower. Instead, second-round effects in the 
simulations include only partially the role played in banks’ buffers by central bank lending as they 
apply to reacting banks. 2, boulevard royal
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